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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) overseas Chinese 
policy from its founding to the present.  Over time China’s overseas Chinese policy has 
evolved to reflect changing migration patterns and favorable international conditions.  
The overseas Chinese have been both a problem and an instrument of China’s domestic 
and foreign policy agenda.  The one constant in Beijing’s domestic agenda has been the 
need to attract foreign exchange—primarily through the overseas Chinese in the form of 
remittance or investment.  Moreover, there has been significant continuity in its foreign 
policy and corresponding overseas Chinese policy.  One of Beijing’s primary foreign 
policy objectives has been to restore relations with its neighbors. Therefore, China sought 
diplomatic relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors and made efforts to solve the 
overseas Chinese dual nationality problem.  Finally, China’s third and fourth generation 
leaders have undertaken a more pragmatic, sophisticated, and subtler foreign policy 
approach to achieving Beijing's ambitions.  China’s "new diplomacy" is changing the 
way its neighbors view the emerging power and their overseas Chinese communities.  
Thus, the estimated 35 million overseas Chinese have become assets in connecting China 
to the outside world.   
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I. CHINA’S OVERSEAS CHINESE POLICY  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the overseas 
Chinese have been both a problem and an instrument of China’s domestic and foreign 
policy agenda.  Typically, China’s overseas Chinese policy complemented its domestic 
and foreign policy agenda.  On the whole, China’s domestic policies are closely aligned 
with its foreign policy goals.  Domestically, Beijing’s focus is continuing rapid economic 
growth to maintain internal stability.  In line with its domestic agenda, China’s foreign 
policy strategy is maintaining a stable international and regional environment conducive 
to modernizing its economy and increasing its relative power and prestige.  According to 
Dennis Roy “power, wealth and status” are the “three primary and enduring goals” of 
Chinese foreign policy.1  Beijing wants power, wealth, and status in order to determine 
the terms of the game in the changing world order.   On its quest, Beijing is tapping all 
available resources to assist its domestic and foreign policy goals.  Beijing is therefore 
incorporating an estimated 35 million overseas Chinese into its effort to achieve its policy 
goals.   
There are three overarching goals of China’s overseas Chinese policy in the 
twenty-first century:  economic, cultural and political.2  With respect to Beijing’s 
economic goals, the overseas Chinese play an important role in China’s modernization.  
Ethnic Chinese abroad are significant sources of investment and technical expertise.  
With respect to Beijing’s cultural goals, the overseas Chinese can promote Chinese 
language and culture abroad and thereby increase China’s prestige and soft power.  
Finally, with respect to Beijing’s political goals, the overseas Chinese act as mediums to 
communicate China’s interests in their countries of residence or citizenship.  
Furthermore, the overseas Chinese are indispensable agents in resolving the Taiwan 
problem and China’s reunification.  
                                                 
1 Dennis Roy, China’s Foreign Relations (Boulder:  Rowman & Littlefield, 1998):  215. 
2 Elena Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach:  Overseas Chinese Policies of the 
PRC’s Central Government,” Greater China Occasional Paper Series, no. 2, Institute of Chinese and 
Korean Studies, University of Tubingen (August 2005): 1-2 , accessed 1 March 2007; available from  
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/sinologie/sino/gcs/papers/paper2.pdf. 
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A. DEFINING OVERSEAS CHINESE  
To analyze this topic, it is necessary to define the term overseas Chinese as it is 
conceptualized by the PRC.  The Chinese term for “Overseas Chinese” is huaqiao, or 
“Chinese sojourner,” suggesting a state of transience.  The term dates from the late 19th 
century Qing and its usage is still employed today to describe all Chinese abroad.  Two 
other terms are in usage to describe the ethnic Chinese; huaren (Chinese person) and 
huayi (Chinese descent).  These three terms—huaqia, huaren, and huayi—connote a 
degree of ambiguity in the status of these groups and their relation to China.  However, in 
the PRC’s policy-making realm these distinctions are rarely drawn.  Most of the Chinese 
literature uses the generic term huaqiao huaren, signifying that both groups fall within 
the scope of the PRC overseas Chinese policy.3  The usage of the term “overseas 
Chinese” in this work is equivalent to the Chinese term huaqiao huaren to refer to all 
ethnic Chinese living abroad. 
Who are the overseas Chinese?  Where do they live?  What are their occupations?  
Statistics are not reliable, nonetheless at the end of the twentieth century an estimated 35 
million ethnic Chinese live abroad.  The majority of overseas Chinese are working 
people, business entrepreneurs and economic migrants of varying levels of skill and 
resources.  They are now a presence in more or less every country of the world.  
Southeast Asia is home to the majority of ethnic Chinese, estimated at 20 million.  In the 
1990s, it was estimated that the private wealth of Southeast Asia’s 20 million ethnic 
Chinese exceeded US$200 billion.4  The 1990s witnessed a notable increase in Chinese 
migration to Western countries, with more than 4 million ethnic Chinese living in North 
America alone.  These recent migrants are students and science, business and technology 
professionals.  The following statistics illustrate the change in migration patterns.  In 
1979, there were a total of 1,000 Chinese students studying in the United States.  In 1989, 
                                                 
3 Elena Barabantseva, “The Party-State’s Transnational Outreach,” 1. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
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there were 33,390 and by 1999, 54,466.5  Overseas Chinese are an important group that 
spans the globe, influencing global commerce and international relations. 
 
Country 2005 Rank 2004 Rank Growth  
 Number  Number  Rate (%) 
Indonesia 7,566,200 1 7,463,404 1 1.38 
Thailand 7,053,240 2 7,254,261 2 -2.77 
Malaysia 6,187,400 3 6,114,900 3 1.19 
United States 3,376,031 4 3,280,823 4 2.9 
Singapore 2,684,900 5 2,650,100 5 1.31 
Canada 1,612,173 6 1,548,650 6 4.1 
Peru 1,300,000 7 1,300,000 7 0 
Vietnam 1,263,570 8 1,246,845 8 1.34 
Philippines 1,146,250 9 1,139,243 9 0.62 
Myanmar 1,101,314 10 1,090,087 10 1.03 
Russia 998,000 11 998,000 11 0 
Australia 614,694 12 599,600 12 2.52 
Japan 519,561 13 487,570 13 6.56 
Kampuchea 343,855 14 336,124 14 2.3 
United Kingdom 296,623 15 283,470 15 4.64 
Table 1.   The Ranking of Overseas Chinese 6* 
 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE 
For several centuries the Chinese government discouraged Chinese migration.  
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) instituted laws creating barriers to emigration and trade.  
Later, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) banned all such activities.  In the nineteenth century, 
China’s defeat by foreign powers, prompted the Qing government to permit labor 
                                                 
5 Sufei Li, “Navigating U.S.-China Waters:  The Experience of Chinese Students and Professionals in 
Science, Technology, and Business,” in The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China 
Relations:  Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, eds. Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang 
Yin. (Armonk:  M.E. Sharpe, 2002):  23. 
6 “The Ranking of Overseas Chinese,” The Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, R.O.C. 
(Taiwan) Website, accessed 6 April 2007; available from 
http://www.ocac.gov.tw/english/public/public.asp?selno=1163&no=1163&level=B. 
* The overseas Chinese population statistics provided by the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 
(OCAC), Republic of China (Taiwan) may be disputed by the PRC.  Note the population of overseas 
Chinese is in constant fluctuation.   The table provides the reader a snapshot in time of how the overseas 
Chinese population was distributed across the globe in 2004 and 2005. 
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emigration.  A clause in the treaty of Nanking in 1842 recognized the right of the Chinese 
to emigrate, which opened the way for large-scale migration of laborers not only to 
Southeast Asia but to farther territories such as the Americas and Australasia.  Relaxation 
of Qing policy coincided with the advent of the industrial revolution and the end of 
slavery in the West.  After 1859, Chinese laborers increased the population of overseas 
communities, especially in Southeast Asia.  It is estimated that over two million Chinese 
emigrated between 1848 and 1883.7  Finally in 1893, the Qing officially lifted the ban on 
foreign travel.8   
Motivated by the wealth and resources of the Chinese living abroad, in 1909, the 
Qing adopted a nationality law containing the principle of jus sanguinis to legitimize its 
claim to these subjects.  Jus sanguinis, “right of blood,” made every ethnic Chinese, 
regardless of place of birth or residence, Qing subjects.9  This nationality law was later 
adopted by the Nationalist government and inherited by the PRC.  The nationality law 
and tradition of sojourning served as obstacles to the ethnic Chinese assimilating into 
their countries of residence.  Because of the tradition of sojourning, the Chinese often 
viewed themselves as temporary residents with the intention of returning. Chinese 
migrants established separate schools and maintained their own distinct culture and 
language.  Further complicating the overseas Chinese assimilation was the role of racism 
in creating obstacles to ethnic Chinese gaining citizenship in their countries of residence.  
The problem of dual nationality would trouble the PRC’s foreign relations with Southeast 
Asian countries into the 1980s.   
During the Republican period (1912-1949), various Chinese governments 
continued to emphasize links with the overseas Chinese.  For instance, Kuomintang 
(KMT) nationality law of 1929 reaffirmed the principle of jus sanguinis.  The KMT 
claimed all ethnic Chinese living abroad, “believing they could be an instrument of 
foreign policy, and even listed overseas Chinese policy as the first objective of foreign 
                                                 
7 Paul J. Bolt, China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia 
(Westport:  Praeger Publishing, 2000):  38. 
8 Wang Gungwu, The Chinese Overseas:  From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2000):  46. 
9 Paul J. Bolt, China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese, 38. 
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policy.”10  Furthermore, the Nationalist government established institutions, such as the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, to woo the overseas Chinese.  Although the KMT 
had many reasons to promote ties with the overseas Chinese, the primary motivation was 
to raise funds.  To advance this goal, the KMT drafted special legislation giving overseas 
Chinese favorable investment terms and incentives, such as the Law to Encourage the 
Effectuation of Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Homeland and the Overseas Chinese 
Incentive Ordinance.11  The KMT also initiated programs to promote Chinese culture and 
nationalism among overseas Chinese communities such as sending teachers to Southeast 
Asia.  Unfortunately, the KMT’s aggressive courting of the overseas Chinese alienated 
the countries in Southeast Asia.   
When the Communist Party gained control of China in 1949, the international 
situation was very different from that encountered by the Qing and Nationalist 
governments.  Southeast Asian nationalism was on the rise after the end of the Second 
World War.  This phenomenon further heightened suspicion of the overseas Chinese as 
subversive elements in the minds of Southeast Asians.12  The policies of previous 
Chinese governments complicated the PRC’s effort to establish diplomatic relations with 
Southeast Asian states—where the majority of overseas Chinese resided.  China’s 
relationship with the overseas Chinese could not be separated from its relationship with 
the countries in which they reside.  The newly established PRC soon discovered the dual 
nationality problem impeded its efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the nations 
in Southeast Asia.  
C. THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 
The Chinese arrival in the United States can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century.  However, it was not until the Gold Rush years in the mid-nineteenth century 
that Chinese immigration reached a large scale. By the time Congress passed the Chinese 
                                                 
10 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
1972):  11. 
11 Paul J. Bolt, China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese, 40. 
12 Ibid., 43. 
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Exclusion Act in 1882, the Chinese population in the United States had reached about 
150,000.  Including those who returned to China during this period, some 322,000 
Chinese took the trip across the Pacific from 1849 to1882—before the Chinese Exclusion 
Act Prohibited their entry.13   
In their new American home, the Chinese “Gold Mountain Travelers” found a 
great deal of hardship.  These immigrants found little support from the Qing government 
in their struggle to survive in a strange land.  Consequently, they attributed their hardship, 
especially racial discrimination, to the weakness of their homeland.  These Chinese 
sojourners believed that a strong China could help them win acceptance from mainstream 
American society and improve their lot in their new country.14  Thus, when asked by 
Chinese American leaders for donations to help China, they responded enthusiastically.  
The concerns of early Chinese immigrants for China reflected their wish to improve their 
treatment and status in the United States. 
After the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese immigration to the United 
States came to a stand still.  This changed with the United States Immigration Act of 
1965, which removed racial criteria from immigration policy.  The new law provided an 
equal allotment to each nation-state, and the annual quota of 105 jumped to 20,000 for 
China.15  The inflow of Chinese immigrants more or less doubled each decade between 
1960 and 1995, with the Chinese population in the United States increasing from under 
240,000 to over 2 million.16  However it was not until after the normalization of U.S.-
China diplomatic relations in 1979 that large numbers of Chinese immigrated to America.  
                                                 
13 Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin, “Chinese American Transnationalism and U.S.-China 
Relations,” in The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations:  Transnational 
Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, eds. Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin (Armonk:  M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002):  xii. 
14 Ibid., xii. 
15 Haiming Liu, “Historical Connections Between the Chinese Trans-Pacific Family and U.S.-China 
Relations,” in The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations:  Transnational 
Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, eds. Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin (Armonk:  M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002):  10. 
16 Wellington K.K. Chan, “Chinese American Business Networks and Trans-Pacific Economic 
Relations Since the 1970s,” in The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations:  
Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, eds. Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin 
(Armonk:  M.E. Sharpe, 2002):  146. 
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The United States quickly became the largest receiving country of Chinese emigration.17  
This new community of overseas Chinese would eventually contribute to China’s 
modernization and influence U.S.-China relations. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on China and the overseas Chinese advances several underlying 
themes:  the legacy of colonization in Southeast Asia, state-to-state relations between 
China and Southeast Asian countries, ethnic Chinese politics in Southeast Asia, and 
overseas Chinese economic relations with China.  Although various scholars have 
analyzed the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy from 1949 to the present, few studies 
include the ethnic Chinese living beyond Southeast Asia.  This implies that the issue of 
the overseas Chinese was primarily centered on China’s foreign relations with Southeast 
Asia.   
Coming out of a hard fought war with the Japanese and subsequent civil war, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced many challenges in forming a new nation.  From 
the founding of the PRC, the new Chinese government struggled to gain diplomatic 
recognition.  Only a few nations, the USSR and its Soviet bloc, formally recognized the 
new government.  The United States did not formally establish diplomatic relations with 
the PRC until 1979.  Coming out of the Second World War, China as well as its 
Southeast Asian neighbors faced the legacy of colonialism and the formation of nation-
states conforming to the international system.  One legacy of colonialism requiring 
resolution was the issue of the ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia.  The CCP 
inherited the Nationalist government jus sanguinis policy—citizenship by “right of 
blood”—which gave rise to the dual nationality problem for ethnic Chinese living abroad.  
This policy led countries, especially in Southeast Asia, to view overseas Chinese as 
subversive elements threatening the stability of their governments.   
Prior to 1979, one of the major controversies on this topic was the potential 
subversion of Southeast Asian states by overseas Chinese, the purported “fifth column.”  
                                                 
17 Haiming Liu, “Historical Connections Between the Chinese Trans-Pacific Family and U.S.-China 
Relations,” 12. 
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Stephen Fitzgerald’s work China and the Overseas Chinese:  A Study of Peking’s 
Changing Policy 1949-1970 dispels this argument.18  Although dated, this work provides 
one of the few studies on the policy of the PRC towards the overseas Chinese during this 
period.  According to Fitzgerald, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy was usually 
subordinate to foreign policy and evolved over time with the changing international and 
domestic climate.  Fitzgerald contends that Beijing was not able to effectively manipulate 
the overseas Chinese to subvert Southeast Asian countries.  On the contrary, during initial 
state formation, Fitzgerald finds that the CCP perceived the overseas Chinese more as a 
problem needing to be resolved rather than an asset. 
The next major shift in the PRC’s policy toward the overseas Chinese occurred 
during the Cultural Revolution.  Stephen Fitzgerald explains how Beijing’s policies in 
this period focused inward, mainly on the domestic overseas Chinese and returned 
overseas Chinese.  In the past, these two groups received preferential treatment.   
However, with the onset of the Cultural Revolution the overseas Chinese were labeled as 
“bourgeoisie” and “capitalists.”  With their fall from grace, Beijing discontinued special 
treatment for the overseas Chinese returnees and relatives and soon disbanded the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.  According to Fitzgerald, the Cultural Revolution 
marked a period in which overseas Chinese policy became subordinate to the domestic 
agenda.   
By December 1977, the overseas Chinese once again emerged as an important 
issue on China’s political agenda and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was re-
established.  C.Y Chang’s study “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy” discusses the 
resuscitation of the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy following the Cultural Revolution.  
Like Fitzgerald, Chang maintains that China’s foreign policy dictated the direction of its 
overseas Chinese policy.  The restoration of overseas Chinese work paralleled broader 
changes in domestic and foreign policy shifts under Deng’s leadership.  Beijing 
appreciated the potential contribution of the overseas Chinese to “the achievement of the 
                                                 
18 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
1972). 
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four modernizations in China and in combating Soviet hegemonism abroad.”19  During 
this period, China and the United States established official diplomatic ties and the PRC’s 
overseas Chinese policy reflected this change.   
The next major shift occurred in the 1990s with a strategy of actively appealing to 
and liaising with ethnic Chinese around the world.  The PRC’s overseas Chinese policy 
transformed from passive anticipation of remittance via relatives to active state liaison.  
During the 1990s, the PRC took notice of an increasing number of Chinese students and 
professionals migrating to North America, Australia, Japan and Europe.  Mette Thunø’s 
article “Reaching out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas:  The Trans-territorial Scope 
of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century” explores the evolution of China’s overseas 
policy to the present.20  Thunø contends Beijing began to recognize these new migrants 
as potential assets for investment and knowledge resource.  The PRC was widening the 
net to incorporate all ethnic Chinese living abroad.  Thunø’s work is a rare study of the 
PRC’s overseas Chinese policy that includes the growing ethnic Chinese population in 
North America.  
The latest adjustment in the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy also coincided with 
China’s foreign policy shift toward soft power diplomacy—the so-called “charm 
offensive.”  A convenient date for China’s shift toward soft power is 1997.  Coming out 
of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, Beijing recognized that the use of hard power was 
ineffective in advancing its foreign policy goals.  Additionally, the actions taken by 
Beijing to alleviate the 1997 Asian financial crisis produced significant goodwill with its 
Asian neighbors.  In the past, political involvement of the ethnic Chinese was viewed 
with suspicion; however the current international environment has become favorable for 
ethnic Chinese to take a more active role in politics.  As China increased its soft power, 
ethnic Chinese increased their standing abroad and vice versa.  These symbiotic events 
have led China to increase its soft power and utilize the ethnic Chinese to increase its  
 
                                                 
19 C.Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” The China Quarterly, no. 82 (June 1980):  282. 
20 Mette Thunø, “Reaching out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas:  The Trans-territorial Scope of 
the PRC by the End of the 20th Century,” The China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001):  910-929. 
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influence.  There are no current studies specifically tieing Beijing’s soft power initiatives 
to its overseas Chinese policy.  This thesis analyzes this recent phenomenon in overseas 
Chinese affairs. 
Past works are useful in providing a historical overview of the PRC’s overseas 
Chinese policy and its evolution over time.  However, there is a significant gap in the 
research.  Although several scholars contend that overseas Chinese policy is subordinate 
to foreign policy, none of these studies have specifically linked the two.  Furthermore, 
few studies include the ethnic Chinese living in the West and how the PRC is 
incorporating these emerging communities into its strategy.  Often ignored are the 4 
million ethnic Chinese living in North America.  Finally, Paul Bolt’s work China and 
Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese:  State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia examines 
rising anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia and the possible backlash as a result of 
ethnic Chinese attachment with mainland China.21  Likewise, a corresponding study is 
required to investigate anti-Chinese sentiment in the West and other unintended 
consequences as a result of China’s overseas Chinese policy. 
E. OVERVIEW 
China has a clear worldwide policy towards the overseas Chinese, and its success 
has implications for Beijing’s national agenda beyond economic growth.  Over time the 
PRC’s overseas Chinese policy evolved to reflect changing migration patterns and 
favorable international conditions.  The PRC’s overseas Chinese policy was typically an 
instrument of Beijing’s foreign and domestic objectives.  Thus, changes in China’s 
overseas Chinese policy often parallel broader changes in China’s domestic and foreign 
policy goals and initiatives.  In addition, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy was a 
function of the overseas Chinese themselves—where they lived and what they were 
capable of doing.  When the Chinese migrated to North America, Australia and Europe in 
greater numbers, the range of policies available to Beijing expanded to accommodate this 
change.  In sharp contrast to the past, rapid economic growth and a favorable 
international environment have made Beijing’s task easier because many overseas 
                                                 
21  Paul J. Bolt, China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese. 
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Chinese now view China in a positive light.  For China’s neighbors and the United States, 
the growing relationship between the PRC and the overseas Chinese provides a reason to 
say “China is on the rise” that goes beyond mere rhetoric.   
The following chapters provide an overview of the PRC’s overseas Chinese 
policy, beginning with Mao and ending with the third and fourth generation leaders.  
Chapter II covers China’s policy during Mao Zedong’s administration, from the fifties to 
the late seventies.  In the fifties, Beijing’s sought state-to-state relations with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors and made efforts to solve the dual nationality problem.  In the sixties, 
China aspired to become the beacon of Maoist revolution while disrupting the overseas 
Chinese cause both in and outside China.  In the seventies, Beijing assumed measures to 
mend relations with the overseas Chinese and put policies back on track after the 
disruption of the Cultural Revolution.  Chapter III covers Deng Xiaoping’s policies from 
the eighties to the mid-nineties.  In the eighties, China set its sights on improving its 
economic condition enlisting the overseas Chinese to help it modernize.  Chapter IV 
addresses the mid-nineties to the present, discussing the incorporation of the overseas 
Chinese in the area of politics to enhance Chinese soft power.  Finally, Chapter V 
provides a few concluding thoughts. 
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II. THE MAO ERA 
China’s overseas Chinese policy usually complemented both its domestic and 
foreign policy agenda.  However, at times the Chinese government had to balance 
domestic and foreign policy priorities.  At times, foreign policy was more important than 
domestic policy, but at other times the priority was reversed.  This was true during the 
Mao era.  During the Mao years—two men, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai—monopolized 
decision-making in foreign policy.  Consequently, there was significant continuity in 
foreign relations in both strategic perspective and foreign policy goals during this period.  
According to Michael Yahuda, the dominant factors influencing change in China’s 
foreign policy direction were the policies of the superpowers—the United States and the 
Soviet Union.22  A profound element in China’s international posture was its relative 
weakness with respect to the superpowers.  Yahuda identifies three phases of China’s 
foreign policy during the Mao era:  the Sino-Soviet alliance, Third World radicalism, and 
alignment with the West.23  Since Beijing’s changing foreign policy goals influences its 
overseas Chinese policy, these phases provide context for Beijing’s evolving policy 
towards the overseas Chinese.   
A. THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE 
The Sino-Soviet alliance phase of China’s foreign policy loosely corresponds to 
the 1950s. From the beginning of the People’s Republic of China, the foundation of 
Beijing’s approach to its uncertain international context was the alliance with the Soviet 
Union.  At this time the PRC was recognized by only 18 countries, 11 of those were in 
the Soviet bloc.  With the exception of the USSR, no other great power recognized the 
government in Beijing.  In the summer of 1949, Mao declared that the New China would 
“lean to the side” of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union not only provided political 
recognition but also economic and military assistance to the fledgling state.  Moreover, 
China adopted or copied much of the Soviet model in governance and organization.  
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Sealing the relationship, on 14 February 1950, the two countries signed the “Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.”      
Initiating the “Bandung Phase” in 1955, Zhou Enlai attended the first conference 
of Afro-Asian countries held in Bandung, Indonesia.  According to Yahuda, the 
“’Bandung Phase’ marked the beginning of the Third World dimension of China’s 
foreign policy.”24  China’s general line during this period was to establish solidarity with 
the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, as well as promote the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence.25  Mao envisioned China’s role as the leader of the Third World 
and the vanguard of socialist revolution.   In Mao’s view, China and Third World nations 
shared a common history of colonialism and therefore were potential allies against 
Western imperialism.  Thus, he showed a “willingness to deal with all governments 
regardless of their political hue and to solve all problems with moderation and 
diplomacy.”26  In support of Mao’s aspirations, Beijing sought better relations with the 
newly independent countries in the Third World in particular its neighbors in Southeast 
Asia.  In an effort to improve relations with Southeast Asia, Zhou Enlai negotiated a 
treaty with Indonesia in 1955 that would end dual citizenship for the Chinese in 
Indonesia.  He also offered to sign a nonaggression treaty with the Philippines and 
assured Thailand that China had no ill intentions in setting up a Thai Autonomous Zone 
in Yunnan province. 27    
The high population of ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia complicated 
Beijing’s relationship with the region’s nations.  According to Stephen Fitzgerald, when 
the CCP came to power in 1949 it inherited three problems in regards to the overseas 
Chinese:  1) assuming responsibility for the overseas Chinese committed China to 
involvement in Southeast Asia; 2) the KMT nationality law had engendered little trust 
and goodwill from Southeast Asians; and 3) the lack of assimilation of ethnic Chinese to 
indigenous culture strained the relationship between Chinese and non-Chinese in 
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Southeast Asia.28  Thus, in many respects the PRC viewed the overseas Chinese as an 
impediment to state-to-state relations with Southeast Asia.   
Zhou Enlai first formally acknowledged the existence of an “overseas Chinese 
problem” in a statement at the First National People’s Congress in September 1954.   
China has approximately 12 million national residents abroad.  They have 
lived together in friendship for many years with the people of the countries 
of residence, and they made positive contributions to the development and 
prosperity of the local economies.  For the most part they do not 
participate in political activities in the countries of residence.  For the last 
few years, the position of the Overseas Chinese in those countries which 
are unfriendly to China has been extremely difficult.  We hope that these 
countries will be able to refrain from discriminating against our nationals 
and respect their proper rights and interests.  For our part, we are willing 
to urge the Overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the local government 
and local social customs.  It is worth pointing out that in the past, 
reactionary Chinese governments never made any attempt to solve the 
problem of Overseas Chinese nationality.  This not only places the 
Overseas Chinese in a difficult position, but was often the cause of discord 
between China and the countries of residence.  In order to improve this 
situation, we are prepared to solve this problem, beginning with those 
Southeast Asian countries with which we have diplomatic relations. 29 
A direct product of China’s peaceful coexistence policy, this statement signaled its new 
policy towards the overseas Chinese.  When Beijing set out to play a more diplomatic 
role in international affairs, it was forced to consider this problem in its relations with 
Southeast Asia.  China’s perception of the problem at the time rested on two 
considerations:  the usefulness of the overseas Chinese and the requirements of peaceful 
coexistence.  If the PRC was genuinely interested in improving relations with Southeast 
Asia, it was necessary to dispel the belief that it was exploiting the overseas Chinese for 
political purposes.  Unfortunately, Southeast Asians resented the overseas Chinese for 
either economic or social reasons.  In the view of the indigenous residents, the ethnic 
Chinese appeared as an alien minority who considered themselves culturally superior and 
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temporary residents.30  As a consequence, they were seen as subversive elements.  The 
PRC’s solution to the overseas Chinese problem was to eliminate dual nationality. 
The PRC and Indonesia entered into negotiations on the dual nationality problem 
culminating in the signing of the “Dual Nationality Treaty” in April 1955 (not fully 
ratified until 1960).  Beijing was anxious to reach an agreement to present the treaty at 
the Bandung Conference.  Although imperfect, the treaty represented a major propaganda 
achievement for the policy of peaceful coexistence.31  The Bandung Conference was an 
ideal platform to demonstrate China’s peaceful coexistence intentions to Afro-Asian 
leaders.  At the conference, Zhou Enlai seized the opportunity to capitalize on the 
negotiations with Indonesia with an offer to solve the problem of overseas Chinese 
nationality with other countries.  Chinese statements emphasized that the treaty was a 
precedent for the settlement of similar problems with other countries.  Beijing’s overall 
goal was to encourage other nations to negotiate on this issue and perhaps enter into 
diplomatic relations.   
B. DOMESTIC OVERSEAS CHINESE AND REMITTANCE 
While China was wrestling with the dual nationality problem, it was encouraging 
the overseas Chinese to contribute to the motherland in the form of remittance.  From 
1949 to 1965, the one constant in Beijing’s overseas Chinese policy was the necessity to 
attract foreign exchange to counter the 1951 economic blockade imposed by the United 
States, and after 1958 to repay its loans to the Soviet Union.  It is estimated that from 
1950-1957 the overseas Chinese sent US$1.170 billion in remittances (an average of 
US$146 million a year), compared to a total trade deficit in that period of $1.38 billion.32   
Thus, remittances played an important part in offsetting China’s deficit.  
China’s overseas Chinese policy has two dimensions—a foreign and domestic 
dimension.  The foreign dimension involved the ethnic Chinese abroad and the countries 
in which they resided.  The domestic dimension focused on two groups within China:  the 
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domestic overseas Chinese (relatives of overseas Chinese) and the returned overseas 
Chinese.  Between 1949 and 1966, almost 500,000 overseas Chinese returned to China.33   
Similar to the KMT, the communist government established the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission (OCAC) to manage both the foreign and domestic aspect of overseas 
Chinese work.   The OCAC coordinated with other governmental agencies to handle 
overseas Chinese affairs to protect the interests of the Chinese abroad, the interests of 
returnees and domestic overseas Chinese all while attracting funds from the overseas 
Chinese.  
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese government issued numerous 
decrees, documents and instructions on how to attract overseas Chinese remittance by 
protecting their interests in China.  The CCP stated openly and repeatedly that persuading 
the Chinese abroad to support the PRC required a light-handed approach towards their 
relatives and friends in China.  Beijing believed it was necessary not only to avoid 
excesses, but to be lenient, even indulgent in regards to the domestic overseas Chinese.34  
The rationale for this policy was that if better conditions were not provided remittance 
would dry up.  For instance, Beijing provided better living conditions allowing the 
domestic overseas Chinese to keep their homes and other personal property during the 
1950-51 land reform.  They were often exempt from participating in various manual labor 
tasks and protected from radical movements.  The government also built special stores 
where scarce goods could be purchased by domestic overseas Chinese only with 
remittances.35  Stephen Fitzgerald notes the consequences of this special treatment:   
By the time the Party entered its second decade of rule there was no 
question of them (domestic overseas Chinese) being a class apart merely 
because they had relatives overseas.  The guideline was by then very 
simple; if they received foreign exchange they were entitled to slightly 
more food and clothing rations than the masses, but in all other respects 
they were to participate and to conform.  But so long as there were some 
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who were better fed and clad than the Chinese masses, they remained 
conspicuous.  There were also wealthy returned Overseas Chinese in the 
cities and town who led a comfortable bourgeoisie existence, and who 
were an object of considerable resentment.  And while there remained 
even limited privileges, while there were people who had more than the 
average peasant and who received money or consumer goods from Hong 
Kong and overseas, there were opportunities for stretching regulations, for 
bribery, corruption, and various forms of profiteering.36   
Favorable treatment created inequalities and resentment that violated basic Chinese 
socialist tenets.37   To the detriment of the domestic overseas Chinese and returned 
overseas Chinese, this resentment would later come to a head during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
C. THIRD WORLD RADICALISM 
During the third world radicalism phase, the PRC remained cut off from the West 
and its relationship with the Soviet Union became increasingly strained.  According to 
Yahuda, “China’s foreign policy during the sixties was characterized by growing 
opposition to both the superpowers, and by attempts to associate the Third World and the 
medium capitalist powers in a common united front against them.” 38  The split with the 
Soviet Union was a drawn out process that began in the mid-1950s.  Fissures between the 
two began soon after Stalin’s death in 1953.  However, clear signs of a rift manifested 
after the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty between the USSR, America and Britain in 
July 1962, when China declared that the Soviet Union was conspiring with the Western 
powers against it.39  Four years later in 1966, Beijing broke party relations with the 
CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union).  The rupture finally culminated in the 
eruption of border hostilities over an island in the Ussuri River and elsewhere in March 
1969.  The Chinese response to mounting isolation was to establish two kinds of 
international fronts against the United States that excluded the USSR.  One international 
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front was directed towards small and medium capitalist countries wishing to assert their 
national independence against American attempts to control them, and the other front was 
directed towards the Third World.40  China’s efforts, however, were unsuccessful on both 
fronts.  Shortly after these developments, the Cultural Revolution severely handicapped 
the execution of Chinese foreign policy in general and ultimately disrupted the united 
front initiatives.   
During the throes of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the period from 
1966-69, the radical movement seriously damaged the united front work among overseas 
Chinese abroad.  During the first few years of the Cultural Revolution, China became a 
“revolutionary bastion against imperialist, revisionism and all reactionaries.”41  Lin Biao, 
in his 1965 article on “Long live the victory of people’s war,” maintained that revolution 
should rely on the Communist Party.  Lin suggested that Chinese foreign policy should 
support “the people’s revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America,” as 
China’s solemn international duty.42  During the Cultural Revolution, “revolutionary 
masses” seized many government departments, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and put them under the control of revolutionary committees, disrupting their normal 
functioning.  It is speculated that Zhou Enlai, as the head of government, was not in a 
position to make decisions, while his senior staff were either under severe criticism or 
expelled from office.43  The immediate impact was the repeal of Zhou Enlai’s moderate 
united front approach to foreign policy.   
Because of their allegedly bourgeois background and foreign connections, 
overseas Chinese and their institutions, particularly the ones at home, were considered 
ideologically suspect and undesirable during the Cultural Revolution.  As a result, the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was disbanded.44  Mounting resentment of the 
domestic overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese generated by past special 
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treatment prompted the revolutionary movement to target this group.  Thus, the privileges 
previously bestowed on the domestic overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese 
were repudiated and removed.  The harsh treatment of the domestic overseas Chinese 
alienated the Chinese abroad and damaged any gains Beijing had delicately cultivated 
with the overseas Chinese in the preceding decade.45   The Cultural Revolution also 
devastated state-to-state relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors. 
Whether the Cultural Revolution incited radical political movements of overseas 
Chinese against the governments of Southeast Asia is a major debate in the study of 
PRC’s overseas Chinese policy.  The main question is whether Beijing sponsored radical 
movements or whether the radical movements were spontaneous responses to the call for 
world revolution.  Stephen Fitzgerald argues that it is difficult to demonstrate that these 
incidents represented a new policy course towards overseas Chinese in Asia.46  He 
contends that Beijing’s policy objective was to distance itself politically from the 
overseas Chinese while encouraging them to become respectful citizens of their countries 
of residence.  Fitzgerald asserts there is little evidence that the Chinese government had 
made a deliberate decision to change course in overseas Chinese affairs, considering that 
the official press and radio devoted less attention to the Chinese abroad than at any other 
time since the establishment of the PRC.47  He concludes there was no planned action or 
directive from Beijing to incite the overseas Chinese against the governments of 
Southeast Asia.48   
However, on the other end of the spectrum, some scholars call attention to 
evidence that domestic events during the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution ignited 
communist fervor among the ethnic Chinese in neighboring countries.  Chinese radicals 
attempted to export the Cultural Revolution through Maoist propaganda accessible in 
neighboring countries.  During this period, there was an eruption of violence involving 
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overseas Chinese in neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and Malaysia.  The 
radical incidents in Southeast Asia were therefore a spontaneous reaction to the open call 
for Maoist revolution issued by the revolutionary rebels in China.  One fact is 
incontrovertible—the Cultural Revolution and Beijing’s apparent reversal from peaceful 
coexistence to a militant foreign policy posture had devastating results for the Chinese 
abroad.  Justified or not, many Southeast Asian governments viewed their ethnic Chinese 
populations with suspicion.  Across Southeast Asia, governments persecuted their ethnic 
Chinese populations for their perceived culpability as the “fifth column.”  Indonesia, 
Burma, and Malaysia were a few of the countries affected by radical movements during 
this period. 
Since the 1965 coup deposing China-friendly Sukarno, the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia have suffered indiscriminate and widespread persecution.  After seizing power, 
the Suharto administration used the guise of eradicating Chinese communism to justify 
increasing discrimination against the Chinese Indonesians.  Suharto effectively stripped 
the Chinese Indonesians of political power, banning them from government and the 
military.  He championed a forced assimilation policy against Chinese Indonesians, 
denouncing Chinese culture and banning Chinese language and literature.  Beijing made 
ineffective gestures of protection, protests and attempts to repatriate the ethnic Chinese.49  
The Cultural Revolution only exacerbated the suspicion of the Chinese Indonesian.  
Tensions between Jakarta and Beijing eventually led to the suspension of diplomatic 
relations in October 1967.  Rather than rallying the overseas Chinese to the PRC cause, 
Beijing’s radical policies and impotence consequently alienated the Chinese Indonesians. 
Friendly Sino-Burmese relations, exemplified by the signing of the boundary 
agreement and the treaty of friendship and nonaggression in 1960, were also a casualty of 
the Cultural Revolution.50  Beijing’s fall-out with Rangoon stemmed from Chinese 
embassy personnel attempts to disseminate Mao Zedong thought among Chinese 
residents of Burma and support for the ethnically Chinese Burma Communist Party 
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(BCP).  After returning from consultation in Beijing in May 1967, Chinese embassy 
personnel in Rangoon encouraged the overseas Chinese community to participate in 
Cultural Revolution-type activities.  For instance, the embassy distributed Maoist 
propaganda and encouraged Chinese students to form groups patterned after the Red 
Guards.  Such activities were a clear reversal of previous policies to refrain from 
sponsoring any political groups.  Chinese embassy activities irritated the Burmese 
Government, which took measures to curb these activities.  Chinese embassy staff and 
overseas Chinese radicals responded militantly leading to the outbreak of violence 
between Burmese and Chinese students on June 22, 1967.51  Shortly thereafter, anti-
Chinese rioting spread throughout Rangoon, bringing hundreds of Chinese owned shops 
and homes as well as the Chinese embassy under attack.52 
Since colonization, the relationship between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous 
Malays in Malaysia have been tenuous.  First, the ethnic Chinese did not assimilate, 
maintaining a distinct Chinese identity and culture.  Next, the ethnic Chinese, comprising 
close to 30 percent of the population, controlled a large portion of the Malaysian 
economy.  Finally, they were perceived as a political threat to the indigenous Malays.  
Further complicating the political landscape, the ethnic Chinese were also associated with 
Chinese communism.  Because of the influence of Maoist indoctrination during the 
sixties, Malaysia’s leftist political organizations, dominated by the Chinese, had become 
very militant.  Their publications became very strident in hailing Maoist revolution.53  
Unsurprisingly, following general elections, race riots broke out on May 13, 1969.  
Although the riots were closely related to the militant leftist campaigns against the 
government, there is no evidence of Beijing’s direct involvement.  China, however, 




                                                 
51 C.Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” 287-288. 
52 Robert A. Holmes, “China-Burma Relations Since the Rift,” 686. 
53 C.Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” 289. 
 23
through NCNA (New China News Agency), condemning the Malaysian Government as 
“fascist atrocity,” “lackeys of imperialism, “anti-people,” “anti-communist” and “anti 
China.”54 
The Cultural Revolution marked a period in which overseas Chinese policy 
became subordinate to the domestic agenda.  Until the end of the sixties, China turned 
inwards and presented itself as a revolutionary bastion.  Within China there was a wave 
of xenophobia affecting those with any kind of foreign connection, including the overseas 
Chinese.  Due to Maoist extremists’ efforts to export the Cultural Revolution, Beijing 
found that the radicalization of foreign policy effectively burned many of the bridges it 
had carefully constructed during the Bandung era of peaceful coexistence.  When the fury 
of the Cultural Revolution began to wane in 1968, Zhou Enlai led a counterattack to 
regain control of the Foreign Ministry in an attempt to repair the damage.55  Not until 
Mao’s death in 1976 and the fall of the “gang of four” did the PRC’s overseas Chinese 
policy return to the forefront in supporting China’s national interests.   
D. ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST  
The stark realities of the international environment shaped the last phase of Mao’s 
foreign policy—alignment with the West.  Mao shifted China’s alignment to the West to 
counter its growing isolation and a mounting Soviet threat.  By the late sixties, the Soviet 
threat manifested in its military build-up to the north and thinly veiled nuclear threats.  In 
March 1969, hostilities on the border led to the highly publicized battles over an island in 
the Ussuri River.  Moreover, Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 
1968 proved its readiness to suppress a dissenting ally by force.  This use of force clearly 
articulated a doctrine of intervention in socialist countries judged to be in “danger of 
losing their socialist gains.”56  Further changing the strategic landscape, Beijing 
perceived the U.S. power as waning due to the prolonged trouble in Vietnam, and 
reflected in President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine.  Mao determined America was on the 
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defensive after the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive—considered a turning point in 
American fortunes in Vietnam.  Thus, Beijing was ready to lean to the side of the United 
States.   
This prompted the PRC’s full entry into the international community as 
symbolized by its assumption of China’s seat at the United Nations in 1971.  During this 
phase of moderation, Beijing began to repair some of its relationships with Southeast 
Asia.  For instance, China and Burma returned their ambassadors to their posts in 1970.  
Burma was among the 75 member majority in the General Assembly that voted the PRC 
in and Taiwan out of the UN in October 1970.57  Malaysia and Thailand resumed 
diplomatic relations with China in 1975 while Indonesia followed decades later in 1990.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite China’s changing international environment, the one constant in Beijing’s 
overseas Chinese policy was the need to attract foreign exchange from the overseas 
Chinese.  Remittances played an important role from 1949 to 1977.  Throughout Mao’s 
reign, overseas Chinese generously sent remittances to their families, friends and home 
villages.  From 1950 to 1975 an estimated total of US$4.6 billion was sent to China (See 
Table 2).  During certain periods, remittances declined due to leftist domestic policies 
because monies sent would do little to benefit the domestic overseas Chinese.  For 
instance, the Great Leap Forward leftist policies discouraged overseas Chinese from 
giving, and so remittances averaged only US$90 million a year.  Remittance numbers 
also plummeted during the Cultural Revolution.  The average yearly remittances during 
this period were US$252 million.  Although the average yearly remittances from 1966-
1975 averaged US$252 million, this masked the fact that for the first three years 
remittances fell due to the Cultural Revolution and then steadily rose in the following 
years.  Furthermore, the rise in the following seven years was probably due in part to 
newly established diplomatic and economic relations with the West. 58 
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Table 2.   Remittance and Trade Deficit from 1949 - 197759 
 
Across the Mao years, there was significant continuity in the PRC’s foreign 
policy and overseas Chinese policy with the exception of the Cultural Revolution.  In the 
fifties, Beijing’s sought state-to-state relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors and 
made efforts to solve the dual nationality problem.  In the sixties, China aspired to 
become the beacon of Maoist revolution, devastating the overseas Chinese cause both in 
and outside China.  Finally, in the seventies, Beijing assumed measures to mend relations 
with the overseas Chinese and put policies back on track after the disruption of the 
Cultural Revolution.   
In the 1970s, major changes to the international system drastically influenced 
China’s foreign policy and overseas Chinese policy formulation into the next decade.  
Thomas W. Robinson draws attention to five trends: 
1) the rise of Soviet military power and the relative decline of the United 
States;  
2) the replacement of Cold War bipolarity by a more relaxed and diffuse 
East-West relationship which included greater trade and elements of 
cooperation;  
3) the growth of interdependence in the West, including Japan, and the 
increasing importance of economic questions, especially concerning 
energy and oil;   
4) the emergence of the so-called north-south problem; and 
5) the militarization of Sino-Soviet relations.60   
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Time Period Remittance US$ Yearly Average US$ Trade Deficit US$ 
1950 – 1957 $1.170 billion $146 million $1.38 billion 
1958 – 1962 $450 million $90 million $498 million 
1963 – 1965 $454 million $151 million $963 million 
1966 – 1975 $2.523 billion $252 million  No Data 
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Robinson also notes significant changes in international relations of Asia during the 
decade:  
1) The emergence of six “modern” rapidly growing, capitalist developed 
states or city-states along the eastern periphery of the continent—
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and (possibly) 
Malaysia;   
2) the final American defeat in Vietnam in 1975 and its partial 
withdrawal from Asia; the new activism by China and Japan; and  
3) the new activism by the Soviet Union which has brought it militarily 
and economically into maritime Asia and which in turn has transposed 
the lines of conflict in Asia.61    
 
These events and developments would later position Deng Xiaoping’s administration to 
take advantage of the new international environment.  Moreover, rapprochement with 
America and induction into the community of nations paved the way for Deng’s reforms 
and subsequent shift in overseas Chinese policy. 
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III. THE DENG ERA 
The post-Mao era ushered in a dramatic change in China’s orientation toward the 
world capitalist economy.  A watershed moment in the post-Mao era, the Third Plenum 
of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held December 1978 
marked the rise of Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader and launched economic 
reforms.  The Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology and the 
military) encapsulated the objectives of Deng’s reforms.  Integral to achieving the Four 
Modernizations, Deng initiated the “open” policy.  In accordance with the open policy, 
Beijing sought foreign investment, foreign loans, joint ventures with foreign companies 
and opened several special economic zones.  In all these endeavors, Beijing called upon 
the overseas Chinese to assist in China’s modernization.  Deng Xiaoping regarded the 
overseas Chinese as a major source of skilled personnel and capital.    
Although Deng’s leadership brought about drastic changes to domestic and 
economic policy, the most striking aspect of his administration was the continuity in 
foreign policy with Mao.  As Michael Yahuda attests, China’s leaders continued to 
perceive international politics within the “highly conflictual framework of Mao’s 
geopolitical thought.”62  That is, Beijing’s approach to foreign policy calculated the 
perceived power and policies of both the Soviet Union and the United States.  In the late 
seventies and early eighties, Beijing regarded Moscow as the more dangerous and 
expansionist of the superpowers.  Soviet gains in the Third World, especially in areas of 
direct importance to China, such as Vietnam, compelled China to form a common front 
with the United States and its allies.63  Thus, throughout most of the 1980s, Deng 
continued the strategic triangle policy—leaning to the side of the United States—to 
counter the Soviet threat.   
 Rapprochement with the United States and induction into the community of 
nations had the greatest impact on China’s modernization initiatives.  Signaling China’s 
                                                 
62 Michael Yahuda, China’s Foreign Policy After Mao, 167. 
63 Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy:  Developments After Mao (New York:  Praeger, 1986):  
6. 
 28
inauguration into the world economy, in 1971 the United States ended an economic 
embargo against China that had been in effect since the 1950s.  The quasi-alliance with 
the United States had several benefits for China.  In terms of security, it lowered 
Beijing’s defense costs by alleviating the American threat and securing American 
military assistance.  In terms of economics, it increased China’s access to Western trade, 
markets, investment and technology.  Furthermore, the warming with the West created an 
atmosphere in which the overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia to North America could 
take part in transforming China into a strong and wealthy country.   
 During the Mao era, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy often focused on the 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.  This was due in part to the lack of Chinese-American 
involvement in China after the formation of the PRC.  Chinese-American donations and 
remittances to China declined dramatically because of the hostility between Washington 
and Beijing.  Washington was vigilant about external money flowing into China and 
considered it support for an enemy country.  While remittances from some Chinese-
Americans to their families and relatives continued through clan and hometown 
associations, other forms of financial support to China completely stopped.64  Moreover, 
most Chinese-American communities were dominated by pro-KMT forces until the late 
1970s.  As a result, channels of giving, cultural ties and exchanges to China were almost 
non-existent.   
After a two decade interlude, normalizing relations with Washington once again 
allowed Chinese-Americans to engage with the Mainland and their hometowns.  The new 
relationship allowed Chinese-Americans to “reconnect with their loved ones and their 
hometown in the old country and greatly opened the channels of giving to China.”65  
Moreover, with the opening of China to the West, Chinese students increasingly studied 
and immigrated to North America.  In general, these new immigrants maintained close 
ties with China.  Both Chinese-Americans and new Chinese immigrants had a profound 
impact on U.S.-China relations as well as PRC modernization.  These two groups became 
essential sources of capital, management know-how and channels for scientific exchange.  
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Chinese-American capital ranked fourth largest among the $220 billion foreign 
investment in China by 1995, next only to that from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast 
Asia.66  Due to changing patterns of immigration to North America and Chinese-
Americans renewed interest in the Mainland, Beijing adjusted its overseas Chinese policy 
to target these emerging communities in North America.  
A. SINO-VIETNAMESE DISPUTE 
The most pressing foreign policy issue during Deng Xiaoping’s early 
administration was Moscow’s military buildup and political influence around China’s 
periphery.  China’s efforts to confront Soviet expansion and encirclement focused 
primarily on neighboring Vietnam.  In this context, the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, 
became pawns in the strategic game between Moscow, Hanoi and Beijing.  Once 
strategic allies, relations between Beijing and Hanoi took a drastic turn for the worse at 
the end of 1976 when a power struggle at the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party resulted in the purge of the pro-China faction and the rise of the pro-
Russia faction. 67  After the rift, the main objective of Beijing’s Vietnam policy was to 
maintain military pressure on Vietnam in the belief that the burden of aiding Vietnam 
would drain Soviet resources.68  Hostility between Beijing and Hanaoi would eventually 
manifest in the discriminatory treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.    
In March 1978, the Vietnamese government introduced a program called 
“Commercial Reform of Vietnamese Socialism” which curtailed private trade and 
commerce.69  The new program affected many Chinese traders.  Interestingly, the 
announcement of the regulation followed a month after the Vietnamese-Kampuchean 
conflict in which Beijing surreptitiously sided with Kampuchea.  According to Leo 
Suryadinata, “This policy could have been an act of retaliation against Beijing as much as 
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part of restructuring Vietnamese society.”70  In carrying out its policy, the Vietnamese 
Government forcibly resettled the Chinese and expropriated their properties.  Under 
extreme pressure, in the spring of 1978, the ethnic Chinese began a mass exodus across 
the Sino-Vietnamese border.  In the late 1970s, the total number of Chinese refugees into 
China reached 133,000 and as many as 206,594 boat people reached the shores of 
neighboring Southeast Asian states.  The flow continued into 1980, bringing the total 
number of refugees into China to 260,000 and boat refugees to 400,000.71   
By May 1978, the PRC decided to send ships to bring home the “victims” of the 
Vietnamese government.  While Hanoi agreed to the PRC sending two ships to repatriate 
the Chinese, it denied that there were “victimized Chinese” in Vietnam.  Moreover, 
Hanoi only permitted the PRC to “take Hoa people to China.”  “Hoa people” were 
defined as Vietnamese of Chinese origin and ethnic Chinese who have already become 
citizens of Vietnam.  Hanoi also informed Beijing that before PRC ships could enter 
Vietnamese port, it would provide a list of Hoa people permitted to leave Vietnam.72  
Beijing considered these conditions unreasonable and nonnegotiable.  Because neither 
side was willing to yield, on 27 July 1978, the two Chinese ships returned home after 
staying outside Vietnamese territorial seas for several weeks.   
Hostilities between the two finally came to a head with China’s invasion of 
Vietnam in February 1979.  Although the invasion was triggered by a combination of 
factors and aimed at political objectives larger than the settlement of the refugee problem, 
the issue of the overseas Chinese figured prominently in the thinking of the Chinese 
leaders.  Chang notes that the choice words of “teaching Vietnam a lesson,” which had 
been repeatedly cited as the primary purpose of invading Vietnam, was sufficiently 
ambiguous to conceal some of China’s unstated motives and yet revealing enough to 
show Beijing’s bitterness over Vietnam’s Chinese policy.73  The hardship endured by the 
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overseas Chinese was a testimony to China’s weakness and inability to protect them.  
Understanding they would be left to the mercy of the indigenous majority, the overseas 
Chinese disengaged from China, maintained a low profile and shied away from politics.  
B. REESTABLISHMENT OF OVERSEAS CHINESE AFFAIRS 
Following the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, which disrupted Chinese 
foreign policy, overseas Chinese affairs once again became an important issue on the 
national agenda.  In 1974, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was reinstated as 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO).  Beijing realized it needed foreign 
exchange and decided to resume the practice of encouraging overseas Chinese 
remittance.  Reconnecting with the overseas Chinese, however, required the rehabilitation 
of the domestic Chinese following their persecution during the Cultural Revolution.  In 
September 1979, Deng Xiaoping made it clear that the policies originally enforced by 
decree in 1955 would once again apply, but with certain modifications.74  The 
modifications related primarily to the reestablishment of privileges for the domestic 
overseas Chinese.  The granting of privileged status to domestic overseas Chinese was 
based on the premise that the munificence of the overseas Chinese directly related to the 
treatment of dependents.75   
Despite these small measures to regain the favor of the overseas Chinese, 
overseas Chinese affairs did not gain public interest until 29 September 1977.  During the 
National Day Celebration, Deng Xiaoping commented that overseas Chinese affairs 
should be put back on China’s agenda.76  Two months later, Deng’s political ideas 
materialized at a national conference preparatory meeting on new policies concerning 
overseas Chinese affairs.  Following the conference, a People’s Daily editorial on 4 
January 1978 authoritatively articulated China’s policy toward the overseas Chinese.  The 
editorial declared that good relations with the overseas Chinese were essential in 
advancing the Four Modernization, expanding the united front, and improving relations 
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with countries with large populations of overseas Chinese.  In addition, the editorial 
castigated the “gang of four” for their culpability in the persecution of the domestic 
overseas during the Cultural Revolution.  Furthermore, the editorial called for the 
restoration of overseas Chinese policy and special treatment for the domestic overseas 
Chinese to include “protection of remittances, help in arranging travel, and the provision 
of good conditions for overseas Chinese students.” 77   The editorial also reaffirmed pre-
Cultural Revolution policy encouraging overseas Chinese to take on the nationality of 
their countries of residence.  Finally, foreign governments were asked to “protect the 
legitimate rights and interest of the overseas Chinese and respect their national traditions, 
custom and habits.”78  
Following the party plenum of December 1978 (Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee), the watershed that inaugurated the reform period, the work of the 
overseas Chinese affairs focused primarily on mobilizing the Chinese abroad to assist in 
China’s modernization.  Beijing considered the overseas Chinese ideal sources of capital 
and expertise.  In order to put overseas Chinese affairs back on track, however, it was 
necessary to clean-up the mess created by the Cultural Revolution.  Mending relations 
with the overseas Chinese and gaining diplomatic recognition and trade with countries in 
the region were of utmost importance to Beijing.  Therefore, Beijing decided to reiterate 
the pre-Cultural Revolution principles of disengagement from the overseas Chinese for 
political purposes and clarify its nationality law.  Nevertheless, many countries in 
Southeast Asia and their ethnic Chinese residents remained wary of Beijing’s political 
intentions.   
Sensitive to the concerns of Southeast Asia, in 1980, the PRC passed its first 
nationality law.  In September 1980, the third session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress (NPC) formally approved the Nationality Law of the PRC, which clearly states 
that “the People’s Republic of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese 
national.”79  The Nationality Law further stipulates that a PRC citizen residing in a 
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foreign country that voluntarily accedes or acquires foreign citizenship will automatically 
forfeit his or her PRC citizenship.  This law codified former premier Zhou Enlai’s policy 
that any Chinese who voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship ceased being a citizen of 
the PRC.   
C. REMITTANCE TO INVESTMENT 
In the early reform years, overseas Chinese policy primarily targeted domestic 
overseas Chinese and returnees because of their importance as channels of remittances 
and donations.  According to official Chinese sources, from 1979 to 1989, the PRC 
received approximately RMB 5.5 billion in remittance.80  By the mid-1980s, it became 
evident that remittances and donations were insufficient channels of foreign currency.  As 
a result, overseas Chinese works broadened in terms of scale and scope with Beijing 
implementing strategies to directly attract investments from the overseas Chinese.  In 
1984, Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang met with local OCAO leaders and addressed 
the financial assets of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and North America and the 
potential of attracting 10 percent of this capital likely equaling to US$20 billion.81  
With the objective of attracting investment and resources from the overseas 
Chinese, Beijing enacted several policies and projects to appeal to the profit oriented 
nature of the overseas Chinese.  One of the centerpieces of its early reform efforts, 
Beijing established “special economic zones” (SEZs) to attract investors to China.  
China’s four original SEZs—Xiamen, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou, located in the 
southeastern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong—were selected specifically for their 
links with the overseas Chinese.82  Each SEZ strategically targeted a particular group of 
overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Southeast Asia.  Beijing also 
enacted legislation in 1983 and 1985 granting special privileges to overseas Chinese 
citizens (including those in Hong Kong and Taiwan) and other ethnic Chinese wanting to 
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invest in China.83  In 1986, Beijing enacted 22 sets of regulations establishing clear 
standards for investment from the overseas Chinese.  These policies led to the 
predominance of overseas Chinese capital on China’s market.  As Table 3 shows, the 
overseas Chinese have on average contributed 65 percent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China from the period of 1975 to 2000.84 
 
Years Total FDI Overseas Chinese FDI % Overseas Chinese FDI 
1979-1991 26,885 17,932 66% 
1992-1997 196,810 127,600 65% 
1998-2000 126,633 82,200 65% 
Table 3.   Overseas Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in China (in 1 million US$)85 
 
D. REBUILDING HUMAN CAPITAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE 
To implement its modernization program, China required capital and trained 
people.  Deng Xiaoping would rely on the overseas Chinese to both augment and educate 
China’s current and future professional workforce.  Unfortunately, the Cultural 
Revolution caused a massive brain drain and stymied the educational system.  During this 
period, China failed to produce sufficient numbers of highly skilled professionals and 
suffered from an acute shortage of trained engineers, technicians and other specialists.86  
Even after the Cultural Revolution, China’s professional and intellectual force continued 
to receive bad treatment and many fled.  The period between 1966 and 1976 is often 
referred to by both Chinese intellectuals and domestic overseas Chinese as the “ten years’ 
disaster” (shinian haojie).87  According to the Ming Bao Yuekan (Ming Bao Monthly) in 
Hong Kong, the number of returned overseas Chinese in China between 1949 and 1966 
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was approximately 500,000; by the end of 1976, there were only about 100,000 returned 
overseas Chinese remaining in China.  If these numbers are accurate, between 1967 and 
1972, approximately 400,000 returned overseas Chinese had left China.88  A great 
number of overseas Chinese who fled China during this period were intellectuals and 
professionals—people China most needed for its modernization.  
The PRC intended to reestablish closer contact with overseas Chinese 
intellectuals, professionals and businessman by encouraging them to visit, study, invest, 
or resettle in China.  This was a very difficult task, however, because many overseas 
Chinese feared another “ten years’ disaster” upon their return.  Illustrating the 
apprehension, Deng Yingchao, the widow of Zhou Enlai, on a visit to Burma in 1977 had 
spoken with “disenchanted overseas Chinese intellectuals who complained that the 
treatment they received [in China] made work impossible and life intolerable.”89  She 
brought this to the attention of Deng Xiaoping, who was then in the midst of recruiting 
ethnic Chinese scientists to work in China.90  He planned to recruit 400 ethnic Chinese 
scientists.  Even though it is doubtful Deng achieved his recruitment goal, many overseas 
Chinese intellectuals and scientists did return to China not as permanent residents but as 
visitors.  According to Leo Suryadinata, “some visitors felt that China was not yet ready 
to have too many ethnic Chinese return and live in China because of the lack of 
facilities.”91   
Scientific exchanges carried great importance for Chinese leaders concerned with 
economic development.  The normalization of the U.S.-China relationship provided 
Chinese-American scientists the opportunity for scientific and cultural exchange. 
Although prominent Chinese scientists living abroad only returned as visitors to China, 
their reconnection with China was helpful in revitalizing the Chinese scientific 
community in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.  For example, Physics Nobel 
Prize recipients C.N. Yang, from Princeton’s Institute of Advanced Studies, and T.D. 
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Lee, from Columbia University, both visited China following normalization of U.S.-
China relations.92  C.N. Yang was the first prominent Chinese-American scientist to visit 
China, in summer 1971, right after the Nixon administration lifted the ban on U.S. 
citizens’ travel to China.  These two scientists felt very passionate about assisting China 
in modernizing.  In Yang’s words, it is “my responsibility to build a bridge of 
understanding and friendship between the two countries that are close to my heart.  I also 
feel that I should help China in her drive toward developing science and technology.”93 
Scientific exchange alone was not enough to rebuild China’s science and 
technology base.  In 1978, Deng Xiaoping introduced a series of major reforms that 
included the education sector in order to expedite development and modernization of the 
country.  After China’s isolation from the outside world for more than a decade, Deng 
emphasized the importance of sending students to study abroad.  In June 1978, during a 
meeting with the governing body of Qinghua University, Deng maintained that China 
should send large numbers of student to study other countries’ advanced science and 
technology as soon as possible.  This speech later became the basis for the new national 
policy on sending students abroad.  According to China’s Ministry of Education, between 
the time of Deng’s 1978 speech and 1999, about 320,000 Mainland students and scholars 
studied in approximately 103 countries.94  After the normalization of U.S.-China 
diplomatic relations in 1979, a large wave of Chinese students went to the United States 
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Year Total Number  Year Total Number Year Total Number 
1979-80 1,000 1986-87 20,030 1993-94 44,381 
1980-81 2,770 1987-88 25,170 1994-95 39,403 
1981-82 4,350 1988-89 29,040 1995-96 39,613 
1982-83 6,230 1989-90 33,390 1996-97 42,503 
1983-84 8,140 1990-91 39,600 1997-98 46,958 
1984-85 10,100 1991-92 42,940 1998-99 51,001 
1985-86 13,980 1992-93 45,126 1999-00 54,466 
 
Table 4.   Chinese Students Studying in the United States, 1979 - 200096 
 
Although the intended purpose of Deng’s study abroad program was the eventual 
return of these newly educated intellectuals, many students continued to live abroad.  
Official Chinese data indicates that more than 700,000 Chinese studied abroad from 1978 
to 2003 and only 172,000 returned after graduation; about one in four of those who 
studied abroad returned to China.  One independent study found that only 10 percent of 
Chinese Ph.D. students in the United States intended to return after they received their 
degree.97  Since the late nineties, Beijing has encouraged students to return voluntarily.  
For instance, Xinhua announced in 1999, that China would attempt to attract ethnic 
Chinese scientists to return with grants totaling 600 million Yuan over the following 
three years.98  Additionally, a booming economy has helped entice larger numbers to 
return home.  Despite the apparent brain drain, training of Chinese scientists and 
engineers in advanced degrees abroad has contributed a great deal to the growth of 
China’s human capital base.  Some students do return home with work experience in the 
United States or other foreign countries.  Moreover, returnees play a disproportionately 
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large role in establishing new high-technology start-ups and improving academic 
institutions.   Even when students do not return, they act as bridges in connecting 
Mainland scientists and engineers to international networks of research and innovation.99 
E. TIANANMEN 
The June 1989 Tiananmen Sq uare Massacre had important consequences for 
Chinese foreign relations.  Foremost, Tiananmen and the fall of the Soviet empire 
effectively terminated the strategic triangle period.  Beijing would no longer need to lean 
to the side of Washington to counter Moscow.  Following the incident, the United States 
and many other nations imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions to isolate Beijing.   
Widely reported by the international media, the massacre left a lasting impression on the 
American public.  Americans continue to view China through a Tiananmen Massacre 
lens.  Prior to Tiananmen, favorable opinion toward China gradually rose from 1967 to 
1989 and then dramatically dropped.100  Favorable opinion toward China has not 
approached pre-Tiananmen levels and remains steadily unfavorable (see Table 5).  This 
negative perception and distrust continues to influence Sino-American relations today.  
No longer bonded by a common threat, Washington increasingly viewed China as the 
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1967 0 5 16 75 4 
1976 3 17 29 45 6 
1979 (Feb) 5 25 31 33 6 
1979 18 46 18 7 10 
1980 6 36 30 24 4 
1983 6 37 31 21 5 
1985 5 33 35 16 11 
1987 8 57 23 5 7 
1989 (Feb) 12 60 10 3 15 
1989 (Aug) 5 29 32 22 12 
1991 5 30 35 18 12 
1993 10 43 24 15 8 
1994 4 36 38 15 7 
1996 6 33 35 16 10 
1997 5 28 36 14 17 
1998 (Jul) 6 38 36 11 9 
1999 (Feb) 8 31 34 16 11 
1999 (May) 5 33 38 18 6 
2000 (Jan) 4 29 33 18 16 
2000 (Mar) 6 29 40 16 9 
 
Table 5.   Gallup Poll:  General Opinions Toward China101 
 
Finding itself isolated by the West, Beijing sought to repair its damaged 
diplomatic relationships.  Within three years, the PRC established diplomatic relations 
with South Korea, South Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Brunei.102  Especially significant was normalized relations with Southeast Asian states 
after decades of mistrust over the overseas Chinese problem.  The end of the Cold War 
provided an opening for both China and Southeast Asian states to improve relations.  
China’s neighbors were also eager to improve their economic conditions through trade.   
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Interestingly, the overseas Chinese played significant roles in improving relations 
between China and Southeast Asian states.  For example, Southeast Asian delegations to 
Beijing often included ethnic Chinese.103       
Tiananmen caused a fissure between China and the overseas Chinese.  Tiananmen 
made it difficult for Beijing to entice students studying abroad to return to China.  At the 
time, many students had little desire in returning to China.  Reflecting the sentiments of 
Chinese students living abroad, a Berkeley engineering student said the PRC would 
“make Chinese intellectual as scapegoats, just like what they have always been doing in 
every political movement in the last forty years.”104  A few students expressed interest in 
returning only after the ruling-class elite had passed away.105  As a gesture of sympathy 
with the student victims, on June 5, 1989, President George H. W. Bush signed an 
executive order allowing all Chinese nationals to remain in the United States.  Eighty-
thousand Chinese students and their families would be allowed to stay in the United 
States.  Furthermore, the policy permitted all Mainland Chinese who had arrived before 
the end of 1989 to apply for permanent residency.  The “June 4th green card” provided 
numerous Chinese students and scholars with a shortcut to permanent residency.106   
Tiananmen also provoked fears of political and economic instability across Asia, 
discouraging overseas Chinese capitalist investment in China.  Following Tiananmen, 
conservatives in the CCP attempted to roll back reforms.  During this period of economic 
retrenchment, FDI came in as a trickle.  Signaling a shift in Chinese policy in the spring 
of 1992, Deng Xiaoping gave a series of speeches during his famous “southern tour.”  
Deng’s “southern tour” reemphasized the need for “accelerated economic reform and 
specifically reaffirmed a non-ideological pragmatic approach to experimentation.”107  
Deng wanted to restore the reform agenda and assuage investor uncertainty created by 
economic retrenchment.  When Deng succeeded in relieving the anxiety of investors 
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about China’s overall policy direction, FDI turned into a flood.  Foreign investors, led by 
the overseas Chinese primarily from Hong Kong and Taiwan, responded with 
enthusiasm.108    
 
 
Figure 1.   Main sources of FDI in China109 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Once Deng Xiaoping was in full control, he began economic reforms bringing 
impressive economic growth and significant social changes to China.  Deng recognized 
the need for a stable international environment in order to focus on modernization which 
required improving relations with the outside world.  China established normalized 
relations with the United States and later with its Southeast Asian neighbors.  Coming 
full circle, Deng’s administration began with the overseas Chinese problem in Southeast 
Asia and ended with normalizing relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors.  The 
overseas Chinese, once a problem in foreign relations, became assets in connecting China 
to the outside world.  Finally, the demise of the USSR in 1991 ended the strategic danger 
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which dominated Chinese foreign policy for the past three decades.  The end of the Cold 
War allowed Beijing to reassess its relationship with Washington, Moscow and other 
regional players.   
Deng realized that China could not develop in isolation; modernization would 
require foreign science, technology, capital and management skills.  China’s 
achievements in these areas are intimately related to the contributions of the overseas 
Chinese.  For one, overseas Chinese students and scholars were responsible for 
promoting scientific and technology exchange.  However, the most significant 
contribution of the overseas Chinese to China’s transformation was foreign direct 
investment.  According to Barry Naughton, FDI brings “a bundle of management 
experience, marketing channels, and technology, along with the basic inflow of 
resources.”110  Therefore, overseas Chinese FDI played an important role in industrial 
growth and technology transfer.  With the assistance of the overseas Chinese, by the 
beginning of the 21st century, China had reached Deng Xiaoping’s goal of modest 
prosperity. 
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IV. CHINA’S NEXT GENERATION 
The strategic outlook and policy goals of China’s current leaders have not strayed 
far from those established by their predecessors.  Similar to Mao’s and Deng’s strategic 
outlook, China’s current leaders continue to balance against the perceived dominant 
power in the region; presently, that power is the United States.  As an emerging economic 
power, China has an insatiable need for energy, resources, markets, and security.  Beijing 
is concerned Washington will constrain or contain China and thereby block its rise to 
power.  Under present conditions, China’s foreign policy goals include defending against 
American containment, expanding Chinese political influence and reducing the 
international influence of Taiwan.  As past chapters have elucidated, these aspirations are 
not unlike Mao’s and Deng's vision for China. 
Although there is continuity in Beijing’s policy goals, China’s third and fourth 
generation leaders have undertaken a new approach to achieving Beijing's ambitions.  
Beijing's foreign policy approach is more pragmatic, sophisticated and subtle.  Beijing is 
skillfully using diplomatic tools and soft power to influence and achieve policy 
objectives.  This "new diplomacy" is changing the way China's neighbors view the 
emerging power.  Since the 1990s, Beijing has made efforts to resolve border disputes 
and work cooperatively with neighboring countries.  According to Evan Medeiros and M. 
Taylor Fravel, “Evidence of the change abounds. Since the mid-1990s, China has 
expanded the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, joined various trade and 
security accords, deepened its participation in key multilateral organizations, and helped 
address global security issues."111   Beijing's new diplomacy has also translated into 
changes in its relationship with the Chinese overseas.  This new approach has allowed 
Beijing to bring the overseas Chinese into the fold not only in economic but in political 
terms.  In the past, Beijing shied away from overtly utilizing the overseas Chinese for 
political influence; however, this is no longer the case.  Beijing recognizes the potential 
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influence overseas Chinese communities’ hold in matters of culture, economics and 
politics.  As a consequence, in a virtuous circle, Beijing's new diplomacy is not only 
utilizing the Chinese diaspora to gain influence, it is also opening doors for overseas 
Chinese communities to wield political influence abroad.  
A. THE MID-1990S TRANSFORMATION 
There are several factors prompting the change in Beijing's approach in the mid-
1990s.  First, the Communist Party witnessed a significant turnover in leadership and 
personnel in the nineties.  Alice Miller’s assessment of China’s third and fourth 
generation leaders details a dramatic transformation in 1997.  Miller’s findings show a 
noteworthy change between officials appointed at the 1982 Twelfth National Congress 
and the 1997 Fifteenth National Congress.  Of the twenty-four officials appointed in 
1997, their average age was at least ten years younger then their 1982 predecessors.  In 
contrast to older leaders, many of the new leaders had completed undergraduate and even 
graduate studies.  While none of the 1982 members possessed a university education, 17 
of the 24 1997 appointees held university degrees (14 engineers; 2 scientific fields; and 1 
in enterprise management.)112  Contributing to their experience, many had studied 
abroad, often in Western nations.  Armed with a more sophisticated knowledge of the 
world, these leaders recognized China's ambitions could be achieved through soft power 
techniques and working within the international system.   Furthermore, with the changing 
of the guard, foreign policy decision-making had become less personalized and more 
institutionalized. 113     
In tandem with Beijing’s leadership transformation, the international 
circumstances had also changed in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War.  For one, the 
global economy took centered stage and countries became more integrated with 
globalization.  Multinational organizations such as the WTO and ASEAN became more 
relevant in regulating the affairs of nations.  Another 1990s development was the 
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reversion of Hong Kong.  Regaining Hong Kong boosted the PRC’s economic and 
political prestige—both highlighting China’s emergence as a great power and 
symbolizing closure to the century of humiliation.  Finally, Taiwan was transforming into 
a legitimate democracy—holding its first competitive presidential election in 1996.  
Taiwan's democratization threatened reunification, and therefore, caused serious concern 
for Beijing.  After the dismal attempt to intimidate the Taiwan populace with missile 
tests, Beijing looked to other strategies to isolate Taiwan politically.  Instead of using 
military measures which had proven ineffective, Beijing began employing more 
sophisticated tools of influence.  For example, China’s diplomatic team in Washington 
began to hire lobbying firms to work with the Congress after the Taiwan Straits crisis in 
1996.114  Beijing, therefore, decided to isolate Taiwan by expanding its diplomatic corps, 
improving bilateral links, increasing its involvement in multinational institutions and 
cultivating soft power.   
Coming out of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, Beijing realized that the use 
of military power was ineffective in advancing it foreign policy goals.  These military 
maneuvers backfired and added fuel to what Beijing calls the "China threat" theory.  To 
repair the damage done to its image, China began its “charm offensive” by employing 
more sophisticated tools of influence such as soft power.  Soft power refers to a nation 
gaining influence abroad by persuasion and appeal rather than by threats or military 
force.115  Joshua Kurlantzick identifies 1997 as a convenient year to mark China’s soft 
power emergence.  According to Kurlantzick, during the Asian financial crisis Beijing 
refused to devalue its currency as a show of Asian solidarity and thereby produced 
significant goodwill with its neighbors.116  Beijing realized this goodwill boosted its 
influence within the region, influence it could wield in other policy matters.  
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In Beijing’s quest to increase China’s soft power, it is utilizing diplomacy and 
tools of culture—tools related to Chinese culture, arts, language and ethnicity.  According 
to Elizabeth Economy, “The Chinese have historically had a very well-established 
network for promoting this kind of influence.”117 China's soft power strategy includes 
making best use of the ethnic Chinese abroad to promote all things Chinese and help 
boost relations between China and other nations.  Thus, in recent years, the Chinese 
government has begun to view the overseas Chinese as more than sources of investment 
and technology.  Beijing is actively rebuilding relations with ethnic Chinese 
organizations around the globe, groups ranging from cultural associations to clan 
organizations to business chambers. 
Most recently, one of China’s top leaders, Jia Qinglin, the chairman of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
spoke at the opening ceremony of the 9th World Chinese Entrepreneur Convention 
(WCEC) held in Japan in September 2007.118  Speaking to over 3,000 ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs in attendance, Jia Qinglin articulated the PRC’s five-point hope for the 
overseas Chinese:   
1) overseas Chinese can live harmoniously with local people and actively 
push forward the development and progress of the country they live in;  
2) China welcomes overseas Chinese, with their own advantages, to take 
part in China's modernization in various forms;  
3) overseas Chinese can be united closely in opposing "Taiwan 
independence" secessionist activities in any form, and continuously 
promote personnel, economic and cultural exchanges across the Straits so 
as to push for an early realization of China' s reunification;  
4) overseas Chinese, while learning from other countries, can carry 
forward and promote Chinese culture;   
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5) overseas Chinese can help promote people-to-people friendship 
between China and other countries in the world. 119 
Jia Qinglin’s speech clearly expresses Beijing’s policy to incorporate the overseas 
Chinese communities in its foreign policy ambitions to include isolating Taiwan and 
increasing its soft power. 
B. COURTING THE OVERSEAS CHINESE 
Beijing is methodically recruiting the overseas Chinese while increasing its soft 
power globally.  Acknowledging the importance of the overseas Chinese by hosting their 
conventions or sending prominent PRC leaders to visit ethnic Chinese abroad are two 
practices to reconnect.  For example, in 2001, top officials from Beijing’s Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) visited more than twenty countries to hold meetings with 
leaders of diaspora Chinese communities.120  According to Hong Liu of the National 
University of Singapore, the “three pillars” of overseas Chinese societies are Chinese 
schools, newspapers and voluntary associations (shetuan).121  Beijing's strategy to 
reconnect with the overseas Chinese is based on these "three pillars."  Aimed at 
coordinating these activities, the OCAO at various levels is supported by corresponding 
front organizations such as the Overseas Exchange Association.  In the words of OCAO’s 
official website, official and semi-official policy organs undertake extensive work “to 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of the overseas Chinese; to enhance the unity 
and friendship in the overseas Chinese communities; to keep contact with and support 
overseas Chinese medias and Chinese language schools; to accelerate the cooperation and 
exchanges of the overseas Chinese with China in terms of economy, science, culture and 
education.”122   
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Proliferating around the world are Chinese language media outlets to service the 
growing overseas Chinese population.  A large number of official and unofficial Chinese 
newspapers have increased in circulation concomitantly with the growing overseas 
Chinese population.  For example, with the increase of Chinese migrants in Australia 
there are 43 Chinese periodicals in print, a 24-hour Chinese business radio station and a 
television channel.  In Europe there are more than 30 Chinese newspapers in circulation 
and in Japan there are more than 40 different Chinese language media bodies.123   As for 
the United States, the number of Chinese newspapers and magazines in circulation is 
exceeded only by those in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.  There are at least four major 
transnational Chinese-language dailies circulating throughout North America; most of 
them are subsidiaries of media networks in Asia with international circulation.124  
Finally, Beijing is expanding CCTV’s international broadcasting.  Addressing the Annual 
Convention of World Chinese Language Press Institute in 2003, Liu Yunshan, the head 
of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, expressed his hope to activate exchange 
and cooperation with overseas Chinese language newspapers.  The intended purpose of 
the cooperation was to “help the world understand China better.”125 
Next, Beijing is establishing Chinese language schools across the globe and 
increasing the distribution of Chinese language teachers to promote the use of Chinese 
language.  In the 1990s, the PRC supported the establishment of local Chinese schools 
and exported educational materials used in 78 countries.126  Most Chinese embassies and 
consulates provide free Chinese textbooks designed by PRC educators exclusively with 
overseas Chinese students in mind.127  China also dispatched teachers to instruct Chinese 
while inviting several thousand teachers from abroad to train in country.128  According to 
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China’s Ministry of Education, approximately 40 million people are learning Chinese as 
a foreign language worldwide and the figure will hit 100 million by 2010 due in part to 
China’s booming economy.  The Ministry of Education predicts the world will need at 
least 5 million Chinese teachers to teach overseas students.129  Beijing now plans to 
establish 100 Confucius Institutes around the world to promote Chinese language and 
culture.  Further marginalizing Taiwan within the overseas Chinese community, Beijing’s 
language training programs are exporting the PRC’s simplified characters.  The new 
Confucius Institutes will teach simplified Chinese characters, which are used on the 
Mainland, instead of the traditional Chinese characters used by Taiwan.  
In the past two decades, there has been an unprecedented globalization of 
overseas Chinese voluntary associations, called shetuan, due in part to the favorable 
political and economic environment.  These associations’ activities include organizing 
professional conferences, facilitating cultural exchanges, holding celebrations for Chinese 
festivals, sponsoring trade fairs, transnational philanthropy in China and arranging tours 
to China.130  Another significant group of new players in transnational Chinese 
organizations are alumni associations founded by Chinese student immigrants since the 
1990s.  China’s leading universities, such as Beijing University, Qinghua University and 
Nanjing University, all have large numbers of alumni in North America.131  These 
shetuan and alumni associations are one of the primary vehicles used by the PRC to 
network with the overseas Chinese.  According to Liu, nearly 100 world conventions of 
Chinese shetuan have taken place since 1980.132  These meetings are patronized by 
prominent ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, business barons, and PRC national leaders.  
Elena Barabantseva expresses the importance of these associations and conventions: 
“Where can one find a better occasion than a world convention—in which prominent 
transnational entrepreneurs, indigenous and PRC politicians, and fellow clan/kinship 
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people are all present—to be seen and to know people in strategic positions?  This 
symbolic capital can be converted into social and economic capital.”133   
Media, education, associations and conventions all inspire overseas Chinese to 
return to China in some capacity.  Beijing is not only assisting overseas Chinese to return 
as tourists, but also to return as students and perhaps take permanent residency.  
Specifically, Beijing is setting up “Root-Seeking Summer Camps” for second and third 
generation ethnic Chinese to fortify cultural ties.134  According to Xinhua news, in 2006 
the 5-day summer camp was attended by 5,000 overseas Chinese youths from 45 
countries.135  Many ethnic Chinese parents fearing their children will lose their language 
and culture willingly send their children to these camps and other educational 
opportunities in China.  Because of China’s increased prestige and power, parents view 
Chinese language as an essential skill for business opportunities.  Finally, Beijing is 
offering special incentives for overseas Chinese students to attend Chinese universities by 
lowering tuition fees.  Overseas Chinese students are charged the same tuition and 
boarding fees as their native counterparts.136  All these programs are intended to deepen 
the connection between the overseas Chinese and the Mainland. 
C. GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS  
In policy considerations, the Chinese long adhere to the formula of “promoting 
politics through business, to influence government through people.”137  As China’s 
economy advances, this formula becomes more relevant.  Hence, success in business 
equates to success in political influence.  Although Beijing’s overseas Chinese policy 
mainly serves the cause of modernization, since the 1990s, its scope has widen to 
encompass the political realm.  China’s economic success, new diplomacy and improved 
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image are creating an environment amenable to overseas Chinese political involvement.  
Realizing their potential political influence, Beijing is working to gain the favor of the 
overseas Chinese communities.  The overseas Chinese are helpful agents in achieving 
Beijing’s broader foreign policy goals in defending against American containment, 
expanding Chinese political influence and reducing the international influence of Taiwan.  
Finally, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy could potentially shape U.S.-China relations.   
While the overseas Chinese around the world are instrumental in bridging their country to 
China, persistent suspicions have deterred ethnic Chinese in America from playing a 
more active political role.   
1. Southeast Asia and ASEAN 
Beijing’s active liaison with the overseas Chinese is most visible in Southeast 
Asia, with the greatest per capita population of ethnic Chinese.  Undoubtedly, the ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia are helping to lay a solid foundation for greater cooperation 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.  For instance, 
Thaksin, former Prime Minster of Thailand, emphasized his ethnic Chinese background 
and publicized his ability to bridge relations between Bangkok and Beijing.  Thaksin led 
some of the largest delegations to the Boao Forum, China’s World Economic forum, and 
pushed for a closer Thailand-China strategic partnership.138   
Economic cooperation is increasingly the driving force propelling the China-
ASEAN relationship.  Beijing’s economic interests in Southeast Asia are threefold: 
developing markets for Chinese goods, securing natural resources, and establishing a 
regional economic bloc comparable to the EU.  The middlemen or glue are the 20 million 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.  A relevant example of the overseas Chinese bridging 
Southeast Asia and China is the efforts of Charoen Pokphand (CP) Thai-Chinese 
conglomerate.  CP was founded by Chia Eksaw, a Chinese immigrant who settled in 
Bangkok in 1921.  His company and successors have maintained deep links to China over 
the years.  For instance, CP was the first foreign investor in China and when other 
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investors pulled out of China after the Tiananmen incident CP stayed.139  Moreover, CP 
has “advised the Thai government on its relations with China, and reportedly even helped 
the Chinese government with its overseas lobbying efforts.”140  
Globalization is in full force in the region and the trend is towards increased 
economic integration.  According to the Xinhua, since 1991, the China-ASEAN trade 
volume grew more than 15 percent each year.  Bilateral trade reached $130.4 billion in 
2005.  Moreover, ASEAN is China's fifth-largest export market, the third-largest import 
origin and fourth-largest trade partner.  China is ASEAN's fourth-biggest trade partner.  
By the end of 2005, ASEAN's investment in China totaled $38.5 billion while Chinese 
investments in ASEAN totaled $1.085 billion.141  In short, money is the engine that 
drives cooperation.  Because economic trading blocs such as NAFTA and the European 
Union wield a lot of power, China is aggressively courting ASEAN to join it in a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA).  During the ASEAN + 3 Summit in November 2000, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed “In the long term, China and the ASEAN countries should 
explore the establishment of a free trade relationship.”142  At the ASEAN-China summit 
in November 2001, Premier Zhu formally made the proposal for the formation of a 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in ten years.  CAFTA would encompass 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in 2010 and 
expand to Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia by 2015.143  China is enticing 
ASEAN members with the lure of open Chinese markets.  According to Sheng Lijun, 
from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, CAFTA is a “political confidence building” 
exercise for both sides.  “CAFTA talks mean that China can engage ASEAN countries  
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constructively for at least ten years under one friendly political and economic 
framework.”144  Establishing CAFTA could possibly position China as the anchor of the 
economic trading bloc.  
China’s partnership with ASEAN is a stepping stone in increasing Beijing’s 
influence in East Asia.  Its engagement of Southeast Asia is part of a greater strategy to 
create an interdependent Sinocentric region conducive to its interests.  According to a 
senior ASEAN official, “This is a long-term game that China is playing.  They want a 
situation in Southeast Asia that automatically takes into account China’s interests.  The 
whole objective of the policy is to avoid strategic encirclement by the United States.”145  
China’s partnership with ASEAN defends against American containment and expands 
Chinese political influence.  Along these lines, the overseas Chinese are instrumental in 
this strategy. 
2. Resolving the Taiwan Issue 
High on Beijing’s agenda is the resolution of the Taiwan question.  From the 
founding of the PRC, Beijing has considered the overseas Chinese indispensable agents 
in reunification.  Historically both sides of the Taiwan Strait compete for the loyalty of 
the overseas Chinese communities.  Similar to the PRC, Taiwan has its own official 
organ to coordinate its overseas Chinese programs and policies, the Overseas Compatriot 
Affairs Commission (OCAC).  For overseas Chinese communities whose ancestral lands 
are on the Mainland, the PRC holds significant advantage over Taiwan.  Beijing often 
hosts conventions and meetings in these ancestral hometowns and uses slogans such as 
“Chinese cultural roots are in China not in Taiwan” to win over the overseas Chinese.146   
Moreover, as China’s economy grows and business opportunities become more enticing 
the more the overseas Chinese are willing to support Beijing’s interests regarding 
Taiwan.  For instance, Beijing’s Taiwan policy includes cultivating leading ethnic 
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Chinese tycoons.  The tycoons’ influence then trickles down into the larger ethnic 
Chinese community.  In many cases, they can push the boards of Chinese chambers of 
commerce to remove pro-Taiwan members and develop closer ties to Beijing.147   
The overseas Chinese have always played a role in the relationship between 
Taiwan and China.  Specifically, Chinese-Americans are influential in shaping U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangular relations.  Chinese-Americans have taken part in both the China 
lobby and later the Taiwan lobby to protect the interests of Taiwan.148  From the 1940s to 
the 1970s, the China lobby succeeded in helping Taiwan block China’s entry into the 
United Nations and United States recognition of the PRC government.  Replacing the 
China lobby, the Taiwan lobby promoted Taiwan’s security and international visibility in 
the face of the Mainland’s strong opposition in the 1990s.149  As China’s image and 
relationship improves with the Chinese-Americans, the influence of the Taiwan lobby 
over Washington’s China policy is likely to be counterbalanced by groups favoring the 
PRC.  The pro-PRC lobby still in its infancy; however, as immigrants from the Mainland 
begin to settle and participate in the political process, they will also challenge the Taiwan 
lobby.   
Independent of their political allegiance, Chinese-Americans’ interests lie in the 
promotion of stable relations between China and Taiwan.  Chinese-American 
newspapers’ editorials continue to praise prospects for peaceful unification and criticize 
military exercises.  Through editorials and public forums, these newspapers repeatedly 
expressed Chinese-Americans’ desire for “unification and hope that China and Taiwan 
would break the ice and start negotiating.”150  Furthermore, readers of the World Journal 
expressed opinions that political disputes between the PRC and Taiwan should be a thing 
                                                 
147 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 77. 
148 The China Lobby appeared at the end of the 1940s based on a broad coalition of foreign and 
domestic members including Chinese agents of the Nationalist government, Chinese Americans, paid U.S. 
lobbyists, U.S. politicians, businessmen with financial stakes, and missionaries expelled from the newly 
founded PRC.  As the influence of the China Lobby faded away in the 1970s, the influx of Taiwanese 
American immigrants formed the better-organized Taiwan Lobby in the 1980s.     
149 Tsung Chi, “From the China Lobby to the Taiwan Lobby,” 121. 
150 Xiaojian Zhao, “Chinese Americans’ Views on U.S.-China Relations,” in The Expanding Roles of 
Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations:  Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions, eds. 
Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin (Armonk:  M.E. Sharpe, 2002):  134. 
 55
of the past and that Chinese-Americans should no longer favor one government over 
another.151  These published views reflect a striking conversion in Chinese-American 
views over the past two decades.  Once in the anti-communist camp, Chinese-American 
businessmen have made lucrative business deals in China.  Moreover, a large number of 
Chinese-Americans have visited the PRC and see China in a new light.152 
Overseas Chinese organizations have begun arranging international meetings 
specifically to denounce Taiwan.  For instance, one thousand overseas Chinese held a 
two-day meeting in Bangkok entitled “Global Overseas Chinese Congregation of Anti-
Taiwan Independence” in 2004.153  Beijing often advertises these events in the official 
press.  People’s Daily published an article in March 2005 entitled, “Overseas Chinese 
communities back Anti-Secession Law.”  According to this article, the Chinese-American 
Alliance for China’s Peaceful Reunification in New York, the National Association for 
Chinese Unification in Washington D.C., and other overseas Chinese associations around 
the world to include Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Belgium, Bulgaria and etc. 
supported China’s adoption of the anti-secession law aimed to prevent Taiwan’s 
secession from China.154  A more recent example of overseas Chinese support for the 
PRC over Taiwan was also propagandized by Xinhua in September 2007.  According to 
Xinhua, the Alliance for China’s Peaceful Reunification in Washington D.C. sent a letter 
to the U.S. Congress denouncing Taiwan’s attempt at United Nations membership.  
Furthermore, this organization affirmed their support for American continued observance 
of the “one-China” policy regardless of Taiwan authorities’ secessionist activities.155   
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Adding a new dimension to cross-Taiwan Strait relations, economic globalization 
is enticing hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese personnel to accept assignments in 
China.  For example, according to unofficial estimates, there are 300,000 Taiwanese in 
the greater Shanghai area.156  This phenomenon is directly related to the common 
experiences of the overseas Chinese studying in American universities and working in 
high technology companies in Silicon Valley.157  Additionally, ethnic Chinese 
technology associations in Silicon Valley serve as a bridge to link technology and talent 
between America and the Greater China area.158  Appealing to this pool of high 
technology talent, local governments in China are accommodating the Taiwanese and 
their families by providing living amenities and quality schools.  These appeals are 
working.  According to a survey conducted in February 2001 by a Taiwanese human 
resources company, 64 percent of respondents expressed interest in working in China; as 
to site preference, 43 percent preferred Shanghai.159  Despite political differences, cross-
Strait talent exchanges spurred by shared experiences in the U.S. are helping the 
Taiwanese to identify with “China” by its historical, cultural, and economic context.  
These exchanges may portend the prospect of future reunification. 
3. U.S.-China Relations 
China’s rising international status is permitting the overseas Chinese to play a 
larger political role in their communities.  However, the opposite is true in the United 
States.  Within the United States, “Communist” China continues to be defined in Cold 
War terms, negatively affecting acceptance of ethnic Chinese living in America.  Many 
Americans believe China will be the enemy of the United States in the 21st century.  The 
unfavorable opinion of China is correspondingly linked to rising anti-Chinese sentiment 
within the United States.  Although Beijing is interested in increasing its soft power 
through the overseas Chinese, its relationship with the ethnic Chinese in America has a 
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hard power element.  The PRC’s interest in American advanced industrial and military 
technologies has put the ethnic Chinese under suspicion.  In many cases, the Chinese 
government is appealing to the overseas Chinese for economic, scientific and political 
gain.  Beijing’s aggressive recruitment of the overseas Chinese in America for seemingly 
nefarious purposes is tarnishing the standing of these communities and their 
organizations.  The United States government views some of these activities as 
detrimental to either American business interests or even to national security.  
 China’s relationship with the ethnic Chinese in America came under suspicion 
when the PRC purportedly tried to influence the 1996 U.S. presidential election.  Agents 
of China sought to direct contributions from foreign sources to the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) before the campaign.  According to the findings of the 1997 Senate 
Committee special investigation, Beijing devised a seeding strategy, under which PRC 
officials would organize overseas Chinese communities in the United States.  The PRC 
encouraged overseas Chinese to promote persons from their communities to run in certain 
state and local elections with the intent to develop viable candidates sympathetic to the 
PRC.  Further implicating Chinese-Americans and overseas Chinese communities in 
America the report stated that, “the use of businesses and individuals as intermediaries is 
increasingly common among Chinese intelligence and military organizations” and, 
“given the way the PRC exercises control over certain businesses and individuals, it 
hardly would be surprising to learn that the PRC directed overseas Chinese to contribute 
to particular parties or candidates.”160  Unfortunately, the scandal and subsequent 
Congressional findings made it difficult for Chinese-Americans to legitimately 
participate in the political process.   
 In May 1999, Congress released an unclassified version of the Cox report on 
Chinese espionage against the United States, which stated that “threats to national 
security can come from PRC scientists, students, business people, or bureaucrats, in 
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addition to professional civilian and military intelligence operations.”161  Years later, 
China continues to be viewed by the United States government as the biggest espionage 
threat.  The 2005 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage identifies China as one of the most aggressive nations in collecting 
sensitive and protected U.S. technologies.162  The report also identifies the potential 
security threat of Chinese nationals working in the United States: 
The number of scientists, engineers, and academics working in the United 
States from China shows no signs of abating…It is likely, moreover, that 
the informal organizations that have been set up in the United States to 
help Beijing track the access of these experts will be refined in the years 
ahead, further facilitating the flow of technology abroad.163  
According to Mr. Szday, assistant director of the FBI’s counterintelligence 
division, “China is the biggest [espionage] threat to the U.S. today.”  He states that “In 
most cases, Beijing’s spy agencies don’t send trained agents to the U.S. to penetrate 
companies and government agencies, but rather simply seek to glean information from 
the hundreds of thousands of Chinese who visit and study in the U.S. every year.  They 
also try to get Chinese-Americans to provide information, appealing to their desire to 
help uplift China’s economy.”164  He asserts that Beijing doesn’t recognize the concept 
of Chinese-American.  In the Chinese government’s eyes, “they are all overseas 
Chinese.”165  In short, Beijing’s policies toward the overseas Chinese, including Chinese-
Americans, are to blame for the notion that every Chinese is a possible agent.   
 In the future, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy could become a topic of concern 
in U.S.-China relations.  Although Beijing is interested in increasing its soft power 
through the overseas Chinese, its relationship with ethnic Chinese in America has a hard 
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power component.  The PRC’s interest in American advanced industrial and military 
technologies has put ethnic Chinese under suspicion.  The Cox report and subsequent 
congressional reports substantiated American mistrust of Chinese nationals and Chinese-
Americans studying and working in critical national security fields.  The treatment and 
handling of overseas Chinese communities in America is a delicate balancing act for both 
the United States and China.  Washington must balance infringing on the rights of its 
citizens against protecting United States business interests and national security.  On the 
other hand, Beijing must balance requirements for technology, scientific knowledge, and 
skilled personnel against respecting the sovereignty of other nations.  Often China treats 
foreign nationals of Chinese descent under the broad umbrella term “overseas Chinese” 
blurring the lines of national sovereignty.  A Chinese living overseas, whether a Chinese 
national or not, is considered to be “Chinese.”   
D. CONCLUSION 
Since Beijing set its compass on a course for modernization, its approach to the 
overseas Chinese has focused primarily on economic relations.  In the past, Beijing was 
careful not to implicate the overseas Chinese in the area of politics.  However, China’s 
economic boom, new diplomacy and improved image are creating an environment 
amenable to overseas Chinese political involvement. The improved status of ethnic 
Chinese abroad is directly related to the improved status of China itself.  Due in part to 
China’s economic success and new diplomacy, in the past ten years, the overseas 
Chinese’s position in society and politics has been significantly transformed.  The 
overseas Chinese once avoided politics for fear of being tied to China’s radical politics; 
today they increasingly advertise their Chinese heritage.  Because of their potential links 
to China, Chinese ethnic identity has acquired positive connotations.  Thus, the PRC’s 
relationship with the ethnic Chinese abroad is increasingly linked to its broader political 
goals such as defending against American containment, expanding Chinese political 
influence and reducing the international influence of Taiwan.   
 As the Chinese immigrant population increases in the United States, the PRC’s 
overseas Chinese policy could emerge as a topic of concern in U.S.-China relations. 
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Unlike the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, who are instrumental in bridging their 
country to China, persistent suspicions have deterred Chinese-American from playing a 
more active, constructive role in U.S.-China relations.  Growing apprehension regarding 
the Chinese threat is increasingly tainting the views of Americans toward the Chinese 
diaspora communities within the United States.  Although Beijing is interested in 
increasing its soft power through the overseas Chinese, its relationship with ethnic 
Chinese in America has a hard power dimension.  The dubious relationship between the 
Chinese government and the overseas Chinese business and scientific community is often 
a target of speculation.  Furthermore, Chinese-Americans are often viewed with suspicion 
for their political activism.  Chinese-Americans cannot engage in politics without raising 
fears the PRC is manipulating the American political system.  It’s a no-win situation for 
overseas Chinese and Chinese-Americans alike: while assisting China in its development 
and relations with the U.S. could improve their status at home, it may also contribute to 




The PRC’s overseas Chinese policy has been typically a reflection, or instrument, 
of Beijing’s main policy objectives both foreign and domestic.  Often the Chinese 
government has to balance domestic and foreign policy priorities.  At times, foreign 
policy was more important than domestic policy, but at other times the priority was 
reversed.  In addition, the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy was a function of the overseas 
Chinese themselves—where they lived and what they were capable of doing.  
Conversely, the capabilities and means of the overseas Chinese themselves were a 
function of China’s prestige.  In a virtuous circle, as China became wealthier and more 
powerful, the overseas Chinese were able to do more; and as the overseas Chinese were 
able to do more, China became wealthier and more powerful.  Furthermore, with the 
majority of overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, China’s overseas Chinese work 
focused primarily on this region.  However, when the Chinese migrated to North 
America, Australia and Europe in greater numbers, the range of policies available to 
Beijing expanded to accommodate this change.   
Despite China’s changing international environment and foreign policy agenda, 
the one constant in Beijing’s domestic agenda has been the need to attract foreign 
exchange—primarily through the overseas Chinese in the form of remittance or 
investment.  Throughout most of Mao’s reign, except during periods when leftist 
domestic policies took precedence, overseas Chinese generously sent remittances to their 
families, friends and home villages.  When Deng Xiaoping came to power, overseas 
Chinese remittance shifted to investment.  Deng recognized early on that China could not 
develop in isolation and needed foreign capital.  The overseas Chinese would be called 
upon to provide the lion's share of initial foreign direct investment.  Unsurprisingly, 
subsequent administrations continued to entice the overseas Chinese to contribute money 
to China.  Thus, the central focus of China’s relationship with the overseas Chinese was 
and still is based on economic symbiosis.   
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During most of the PRC’s short history there has been significant continuity in its 
foreign policy and corresponding overseas Chinese policy.  One of Beijing’s main 
foreign policy objectives has been to restore relations with its neighbors.  In the 
beginning of Mao’s administration, China sought diplomatic relations with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors and therefore made efforts to solve the overseas Chinese dual nationality 
problem.  The Cultural Revolution wrecked earlier foreign relation initiatives while 
devastating overseas Chinese work both in and outside China.  Following the disruption 
of the Cultural Revolution, Beijing resumed measures to mend fences with its neighbors 
and reconnect with the overseas Chinese.  These efforts continued with Deng Xiaoping, 
whose foreign policy focused on improving relations with the outside world to create a 
stable international environment for economic growth.  Coming full circle, Deng’s 
administration enacted the PRC nationality law, decisively resolving the overseas 
Chinese problem and attained diplomatic relations with the majority of Southeast Asian 
nations.   
China’s third and fourth generation leaders have undertaken a new foreign policy 
approach to achieving Beijing's ambitions.  It is more pragmatic, sophisticated and 
subtler using a variety of diplomatic tools, such as soft power, to influence and achieve 
policy objectives.  China’s "new diplomacy" is changing the way its neighbors view the 
emerging power and their overseas Chinese communities.  Previous Chinese policy was 
careful not to exploit or employ the overseas Chinese in the area of politics.  However, 
China’s pragmatism is creating an environment amenable to overseas Chinese political 
involvement.  The overseas Chinese once avoided politics for fear of being tied to 
China’s radical politics, now increasing advertise their Chinese heritage.  The overseas 
Chinese have become assets in connecting China to the outside world.  Although the 
overseas Chinese are now welcomed for their economic links to China, in many cases 
they are still viewed with reserve and suspicion.  It’s a catch-22 for the overseas Chinese: 
while assisting China in its development and diplomatic relations could improve their 
status at home, it may also add to the perception that their loyalties lie in China.   
With the opening of China to the West, Chinese have increasingly studied and 
emigrated to the United States and North America.  Due to changing patterns of 
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immigration to North America and to renewed Chinese-Americans interest in the 
Mainland, Beijing expanded its overseas Chinese work to accommodate these burgeoning 
communities.  Recent immigrants and Chinese-Americans have become essential sources 
of capital, management know-how and channels for scientific exchange.  In the past, the 
overseas Chinese were mainly a Southeast Asian concern, but as the Chinese migrated to 
North America they became an issue in the United States.  Growing apprehension 
regarding a “Chinese threat” is increasingly tainting the views of Americans toward the 
Chinese diaspora communities within the United States.  The relationship between the 
Chinese government and the overseas Chinese business and scientific community is often 
a target of speculation.   
 As China becomes more powerful, will other nations begin to foster more 
resentment?  Beijing’s restraint has contributed to a marked decline in anti-Chinese 
sentiment.  However, the goodwill China is cultivating could easily vanish.  The long 
history of anti-Chinese sentiment around the world, especially in Southeast Asia is not 
easily forgotten.  Assertiveness on Beijing’s part could still lead to outbreaks of anti-
Chinese violence.  In many respects, the fortunes of the overseas Chinese are intimately 
bound to the fortunes of the PRC.  While China’s reputation is improving around the 
world, the “China threat” is gaining traction in the United States.  Adding to fears, 
American news networks broadcast daily a stream of negative press regarding a Chinese 
menace.  For instance, recent stories hitting the airways include Chinese human rights 
transgressions in Tibet, Chinese product safety and Chinese espionage.  As long as China 
remains a communist regime and is viewed as a potential threat to its neighbors, the 
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